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One of the difficult problems that frequently
arises in negligent cases is the matter of proving some
specific act of negligence on the part of the defendant.
In such a case where direct evidence is not available,
the plaintiff might resort to a type of circumstantial
evidence known as the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.
It should be understood from the start that the doc-
trine does not dispense with the requirement that the
party who alleges negligence must prove the fact, the
doctrine relates only to the mode of proving negligence.
The conditions usually stated as necessary for the ap-
plication of the doctrine are: (1) the accident must
be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the ab-
sence of someone's negligence, (2) it must be caused by
an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive con-
trol of the defendant, (3) it must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
plaintiff1 . Some courts have added a fourth require-
ment that the true explanation of the accident must be
more readily accessible to the defendant than to the
plaintiff.
Most states require only that the first three
conditions be met to bring a case within the scope of
the doctrine. In any case where these three conditions
are not present the doctrine does no.t apply. The doc-
trine was not meant to be a rule of substantive law,
but rather a rule bearing upon the proof of negligence.
The conditions represent a logical pattern of e'vidence
creating an inference of negligence. The first re-
quirement deals with the c'haracter of the act, in that
the accident must be such that in the light of ordinary
experience it gives rise to an inference of negligence.
The second requirement is for the purpose of fixing the
responsibility for the accident on the defendant. If
the defendant lacks this exclusive control, or if there
is a division of responsibility, the courts will gener-
ally refuse to apply the doctrine. The third require-
ment is for the purpose of eliminating the possibility
of contributory responsibility on the part of the plain-
tiff. The additional requirement that the defendant
1 - Prosser, Torts, Pg. 295.
knows of the cause of the accident while the plaintiff
does not, while it is generally not considered as an
essential requirement, is considered as a justification
for the doctrine.
Once a case has been brought within the scope of
the doctrine, it does not mean that the plaintiff has
won his case. The effect given to the doctrine of Res
Ipsa Loquitur varies from being one jurisdiction to an-
other, but the least effect given is to prevent the
plaintiff is being non suited. This means that the
case must go to the jury for their determination as to
whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the proof
of the defendant's negligence. When the plaintiff
brings a case within the doctrine the defendant may
then go forward with the proof, to explain the accident
or to rebutt the inference of his negligence. The bur-
den of proof is not shifted to the defendant, and he is
not required to introduce rebutting e'vidence, failure
to do so will not justify a directed verdict for the
plaintiff. The defendant by failing to go forward with
the proof merely runs the risk that the jury will be-
lieve the inference strong enough to decide the case
against him. The jury is under no compulsion to decide
the case in favor of either party, and generally their
verdict will not be disturbed. In the early cases the
doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur was most frequently ap-
plied to accidents involving common carriers. In those
cases the courts combined with the doctrine the high
degree of care owed by the carrier to his passengers,
and as a consequence, in those cases, the court held
that the failure of the defendant to offer rebuttal
evidence was considered a sufficient reason to establish
negligence of the carrier and its liability for the in-
jury. This indicates that the burden of proof has been
shifted to the defendant. These cases were thought to
be the exceptional cases and not the general rule
Although the California courts appear to adopt
the definition of Res Ipsa Loquitur as given by Dean
Prosser,2 nevertheless there has been an intentional
liberalization in the application of the doctrine. How-
ever many California cases hold that the doctrine is
Justified because the defendant knows of the circum-
stances causing the injury while the plaintiff does not,
and to this extent they have, by implication, made the
2 - Ybarra v Spangard 25 Cal. 2d 489.
additional requirement a part of the rule. One way in
which California has modified the general rule is by
their interpretation of what is meant by the instru-
mentality being within the exclusive control of the
defendant. In Escola v Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 24 Cal.
2D 453, and more recently in Gordon v. Aztec Brewing
Co. 33 Cal. 2d 514, the court said that this meant the
right to control. The defendant must have the right
to control at the time of the negligent act, and not
necessarily at the time of the accident, provided the
plaintiff is able to prove that the conditions of the
instrumentality had not been changed after it left
the possession of the defendant, and that all persons
handling the instrumentality thereafter did so with
due care. Both cases involved an exploding beverage
bottle. The latter case involved a bottle of beer
that had been manufactured and bottled by the defen-
dant in San Diego, shipped by an independent trucking
company to Los Angeles, stored in a wholesaler's
warehouse for a short time, then delivered by the
wholesaler's delivery service to the retailer where
the bottle exploded in the retailer's hand while he
was removing the bottle from the carton to put it in
the cooler. The retailer recovered on the doctrine
of Res Ipsa Loquitur.
In another situation where the California Rule
and the general rule do not agree involves the ef-
fect given to the doctrine once a case has been
brought within the rule. In Dierman v Providence
Hospital, 31 Cal. 2D 290 where the doctrine had been
pleaded and the jury returned a verdict for the de-
fendant; the supreme court on appeal reversed the
judgment of the lower court and directed a verdict
for the plaintiff. -The case involved an explosion
of the anesthetic while the patient was unconscious.
The Supreme Court laid considerable emphasis on the
fact that the anesthetic had not been tested before
the operation, nor had there been a test made of
the anesthetic after the accident. In directing the
verdict for the plaintiff the court said:
"Evidence as to the condition of the nitrous oxide was
either in the possession of or available to the defen-
dants and was not in the possession of or available to
the plaintiff . . . in a Res Ipsa Loquitur case where
in addition to the prima facie showing of negligence,
it is admitted or appears without dispute that the de-
fendant has it in his power to produce substantial
evidence material to the issue of negligence but fails to
do so, it must be presumed, that such evidence if produced
would have been adverse to defendants, and under such cir-
cumstances the evidence is insufficient to support a ver-
dict for the defendant and the plaintiff is entitled to a
directed verdict."
As a consequence of this liberal view adopted by
the courts the doctrine has been applied to a greater
variety of cases. In their endeavor to keep the rule
flexible the courts have not always been consistent. 
3
A discussion of the rule is likely to be found in al-
most any case involving an unexplained accident, re-
gardless of whether the doctrine is applicable or not.4
The plaintiff's case in California has been made easier
to the extent that the rule in regard to the defendant's
control (Rule 2) over the instrumentality has been re-
laxed considerably. Furthermore once a case has been
brought within the rule the Dierman Case would seem to
hold that .the defendant must go forward with the proof,
if in fact it has not shifted to him the entire burden
of proof.
8 - La Porte v Houston 33 Cal 2d 167.
4 - Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cal 10 So. Cal L. Rev. 166.
5 - For a thorough discussion of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cal. see the article by
Prosser 37 Cal. Law Rev. 183 June 49.
